India and France have a long history of cooperation since the 1950s. They shared a strategic partnership through diplomatic exchanges and bilateral meetings on trade and civil nuclear energy. France has played an important role in the advancement of Indian nuclear technology. The French Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) offered India technical cooperation on civil nuclear innovation in 1950, which began in 1951, with the two countries signing a bilateral agreement „for the research and construction of beryllium-moderate reactors.“ [28] France continues to make India a strong supporter of global nuclear cooperation. After India`s peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, France was the only Western country to praise the event and stress that it reflected India`s progress in the nuclear sector. However, France insisted that its nuclear supplies should not be used for India`s future nuclear explosions. [29] The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes India`s „de facto“ status, even without signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India by arguing the importance of contributing to the promotion of the non-proliferation framework[47] by formally acknowledging India`s strong non-proliferation record when it did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, one of the architects of Indo-U.S. „India`s confidence, credibility, the fact that it promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, overseen by the IAEA to launch a new export control regime because it has not increased nuclear technology, we cannot say about Pakistan.“ Deal.

[48] [49] Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency responsible for inspecting India`s civilian reactors, praised the agreement as it would „also bring India closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation regime.“ [50] Reaction in the U.S.-led university community has been mixed. While some authors praised the agreement for bringing India closer to the NPT regime, others argued that India had too much leeway to determine which facilities to protect and that it was effectively rewarding India for its continued refusal to join the NPT. [51] The IAEA Board of Governors approved the safeguards agreement on 1 August 2008 and the 45-nation group on nuclear suppliers had to approve a policy authorizing nuclear cooperation with India. President Bush will then be able to make the necessary certifications and obtain final approval from the U.S. Congress. [87] At the IAEA meeting, objections were raised by Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Austria. [88] September 27, 2008: The House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear agreement. 298 MPs voted in favour of the law and 117 voted against it. Another way to respond to these threats is to strengthen our diplomacy by requiring other nuclear suppliers to apply the highest safety and non-proliferation standards in their own civil nuclear cooperation relations – including requiring, as we do, that recipient countries have the additional IAEA protocol in place to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. We also regularly ask suppliers to limit the ability of partners to enrich and reprocess plutonium. And we are working to establish „cautious coalitions“ in the nuclear sector, emphasizing the dangers of nuclear cooperation with Russia and China, both for potential beneficiaries and industrial partners, and by working with like-minded suppliers to develop common approaches to counter the destabilizing and predatory behaviours of these two countries.